تاریخ اہل حدیث۔ڈاکٹر بہاؤ الدین

متفرق مقد مات

در ج ذیل مقد مات مختلف مقا مات پر دا ئر ہوکر اہلحدیث کے حق میں فیصل ہو ئے :

دہلی ۔ عدا لت کمشنری ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1883ء ۔ منجانب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا ۔

دہلی ۔ عدا لت دیوا نی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ1883ء ۔ منجا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا۔

نصیر آ باد ضلع اجمیر ۔ عدا لت فو جداری ۔ سن فیصلہ 1884ء منجا نب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا۔

میر ٹھ ۔ عدا لت منصفی ۔سن فیصلہ 1886ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا۔

علی گڈ ھ، کو ل ۔ عدا لت ججی ۔سنہ فیصلہ 1899ء منجا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

آ رہ ۔ عدا لت ججی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1893ء منجا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

شہر غاز ی پور ۔ عدا لت فو جداری ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1894ء من جا نب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا۔

ضلع غازی پور ۔ عدا لت منصفی ۔ سنہ 1895ء ۔ منجانب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا۔

ایلور مدراس ، عدا لت منصفی ۔ 1895ء من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

بلہا ری مدراس ۔ عدا لت فو جداری۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1896ء من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

بنارس ۔ عدا لت منصفی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1896ء ۔ منجانب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

ما دہو پور، جے پور ۔ عدا لت فو جداری ۔سنہ 1896ء من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

شہر پٹنہ ۔ عدا لت ججی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ1897ء من جانب احناف دائر ہوا ۔

دو مراؤ ضلع آرہ ۔ عدا لت منصفی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1897ء۔ من جا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا۔

کیکڑی ضلع اجمیر ۔ عدا لت فو جداری ۔سنہ فیصلہ 1905ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

جود ہپور مار وا ڑ ۔ محکمہ عا لیہ خا ص۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1902ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

جو دہپور مار وا ڑ ۔ عدا لت فوجداری ۔ سنہ فیصلہ1903ء ۔ من جا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا۔

ریاست جے پور ۔ محکمہ اپیل ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1910ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا

ما دہو پور علا قہ جے پور ۔ عدا لت اپیل سنہ فیصلہ 1911ء ۔ من جا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا۔

کھنڈیلہ علاقہ جے پور ۔ عدا لت اپیل ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1911ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دائر ہوا۔

ریاست جے پور محکمہ عا لیہ کو نسل جے پور خا ص ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1912ء من جا نب احناف دائر ہو۔ا

کڈ پہ، مدراس ۔ عدا لت فو جداری ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1912ء ۔ من جا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا

چھا ؤنی انبا لہ ۔ محکمہ اپیل ۔ سنہ فیصلہ1912ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا ۔

رتن پور ضلع مراد آ باد ۔ عدا لت دیوا نی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1912ء ۔ من جا نب احناف دا ئر ہوا۔

کو ٹہ را جپو تا نہ ۔ محکمہ عا لیہ خا ص۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1912ء۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

سر وا ڑ علاقہ کشن گڈ ھ ۔ محکمہ عا لیہ خا ص ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1912ء ۔ من جا نب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا۔

آ گرہ ۔ عدا لت منصفی ۔ سنہ فیصلہ 1904ء ۔ من جانب اہل حدیث دا ئر ہوا ۔

یہ فہرست جناب عبد المجید(مدرسہ اسلا میہ چو را ہہ نا ئی منڈی شہر آ گرہ) نے شا ئع کی تھی ۔ پھرمسلم اہل حدیث گز ٹ دہلی ج 1 شمارہ 8 ۔ اپریل 1934ء کے صفحہ 7 پر نقل ہوئی جہاں سے مناسب تر میم کے بعد یہاں نقل کی گئی ہے ۔

(صفحات ذیل میں بعض مقد مات کے عدالتی فیصلہ جات کا اصل انگریزی متن انڈین لاء رپورٹس سے نقل کیا جاتا ہے۔ بہاء) ۔

Full Bench

Present: Sir W. Comer Petheram, Kt., Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Straight, Mr Justice Oldfield, Mr. Justice Brodhurst, and Mr Justice Mahmood

Queen-Empress v. Ramzan and Others

7th March 1885

Ramzan, Muhammad Husain and Abdul Rahman were convicted by Cantonment Magistrate of Benares, of an offence under S. 296 Indian Penal Code. His judgment was as follows:-

” The particulars of this case are as follows:-

In muhalla Maddanpura, City Benares, a large masjid exists, generally called Allu’s masjid, after the builder. Abdullah, the complainant, was left in charge of this masjid after Allu’s death, some years ago, and Ramzan, accused, is a grand-nephew of Allu’s, and is also his son-in-law. During the month of August 1884, Ramzan, who it seems, had not frequented this mosque for many years, suddenly returned to it. He was accompanied by Muhammad Husain, accused, and Abdul Rahman, accused, and these three men at once began a series of annoyances to the assembly engaged in prayer in the masjid. The men who use the masjid nearly all belong to a sect called Hanafis, and Ramzan also formerly belonged to it, but has lately become a Wahabi. It appears the Hanafis use the word amin in their prayers, but say it so low that only a person standing very close can hear it. The Wahabis, on the contrary, call out amin at the top of their voices, and by doing so in the Allu’s masjid the three accused naturally disturbed the Hanafis engaged in prayer. The evidence for the prosecution is perfectly clear, first as to the fact of the three accused having entered the masjid on four successive Fridays during August and September; secondly, as to having by their behaviour disturbed the assembly at prayers; and thirdly, as to police intervention being necessary, on the 22nd August 1884, to quell a disturbance occasioned by the accused, and which threatened to become serious. The witnesses are respectable persons, and most moderate in the views they express when giving evidence. They consider the presence of Ramzan and his companions not desirable in the masjid, but raise no objection to their joining the worshippers as long as they cause no disturbance. Ramzan states that there is enmity between him and Abdullah on account of the masjid accounts, and that therefore he was turned out of it on pretence of his saying amin loudly, which is not objectionable to the Hanafis, the real reason being that Abdullah will not give him a statement of the masjid’s income, also that he has always prayed at the masjid. The other two accused say, that on 22nd August 1884, they saw Ramzan being beaten and interfered with, on which Abdullah and his party have included them in the charge brought against Ramzan. The witness for the defence merely state that they consider that calling out amin loudly does not disturb an assembly at prayers, and yet they all state that they only speak the word very low themselves. They also speak to the quarrel having originated in money matters about repair to the masjid, and further, that the three accused have frequented this mosque for years. I note, however, that the only independent witness, a Hindu named Harpal, who keeps a shop under the masjid, states that he has been there for five years, and that only within the last month has Ramzan come to the masjid, never before. Be that as it may, Ramzan and his companions, the two other accused, have not a shadow of an excuse for disturbing the people in the masjid. It is useless to inquire whether it is lawful or not to use the word amin. As long as by doing so the accused disturbed the assembly, they rendered themselves liable to punishment under S. 296, Indian Penal Code. If it be true that the enmilty between Ramzan and Abdullah originated in a quarrel about the income of the masjid, his conduct is all the more resprehensible, for he has disturbed a large number of persons engaged in prayer, merely to gratify his spite against an individual. The Courts of Law are the proper places to settle money quarrels, and not places of religious worship, and it is intolerable that men like the accused should be allowed to cause annoyance to a whole community.

“The Court is of opinion that Ramzan, son of Maddar, Muhammad Husain, son of Allahdin, and Abdul Rahman, son of Abdul Karim, are guilty of the charge preferred against them, viz., that they voluntarily disturbed an assembly engaged in religious worship, thereby committing an offence punishable under S. 296, Indian Penal Code; and the court directs that the said Ramzan, Muhammad Husain, and Abdul Rahman, pay a fine of twenty-five rupees each, or in default, be rigorously imprisoned for one month.”

Hence this application to the High Court for revision.

Reference to the Full Bench

The following question was referred to the Full Bench:-

” Whether the facts proved in this case amount to an offence under S. 296 of the Indian Penal Code? “

Judgement of the Full Bench

Petheram, C.J-

Speaking for myself only, the order which I propose to pass in this case, that the case be re-tried by the Magistrate, and that in retrying it he should have regard to the following questions:-

1. Was there an assembly lawfully engaged in performance of religious worship?

2.Was such assembly in fact disturbed by Ramzan?

3. Was such disturbance caused by acts and conduct on the part of Ramzan by which he intended to cause such disturbance, or which acts and conduct, at the time of such acts and conduct, he knew or believed to be likely to cause such disturbance?

Straight, J. –

I consent to the proposed order, though speaking for myself alone, I am not prepared to say that there is not upon the record sufficient evidence to justify a conviction.

Oldfield, J. –

I am of the same opinion.

Brodhurst, J. –

I am of the same opinion.

Mahmood, J –

In this case I regret I am not able to concur in, or dissent from, the proposed order, because I have not yet been able to form any definite opinion. Under such circumstances, and considering that I am one of the Judges constituting this Bench, I should have thought that the judgement or order of the Court would, according to the ordinary judicial usage and practice, be reserved till I had an opportunity of forming an opinion in the case, and of placing my views before my honourable colleagues. But upon this point I have been overruled by the learned Chief Justice and my learned brethren, and I must therefore defer to their view, though I confess- and I say this with profound respect- that the order of the majority of the Court seems to me to be, under circumstances, one of the doubtful legality. In a recent case- The Rohilkhand and Kumaun Bank v. Row – I had the opportunity of expressing my views, in which the rest of the Bench concurred, to the effect that it is an essential principle of judicial acts, that when a Court, consisting of several judges, hears a case, no judgement or order can be legally passed until all those Judges have conferred with each other and made up their minds together. Upon this occasion, however, I must submit to the view of the majority of the Bench; but I regret, as I said before, that I am not in a position to make any order in this case, and must, ex necessitate, reserve my judgement or order till the exigencies of the business of the Court leave me time to form a definite opinion on this case, which, considering that none of the accused is undergoing the sentence of imprisonment, does not seem to me to be one of any especially emergent urgency.

On the 14th March the following opinion was delivered by Mahmood, J. on the question referred to the Full Bench.

Mahmood, J. –

This case originally came on for hearing in the single Bench before my brother Brodhurst, and, in view of the peculiarities of the question with regard to the right of worshipping in mosques possessed by Muhammadan, my learned brother referred the case to a Division Bench, of which, at his suggestion, and with the approval of the learned Chief justice, I was to be a member. The case was accordingly heard by a Bench consisting of my brother Oldfield and myself, and, in consideration of the fact that the main object of the application for revision was to obtain an authoritative ruling upon the question, and also because the applicant’s counsel informed us that the applicantsts, having paid the fine inflicted upon them, were not undergoing the alternative sentence of imprisonment, we referred the case to the Full Bench before which the case was re-arranged by Mr Amir-ud-Din on behalf of the applicants, and the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Crown. Upon that occasion, after having fully heard the arguments on either side, I was unable to form any opinion such as could be made the basis of any order in the case, and being desirous of consulting the original authorities of Muhammadan law, I wished to reserve my order to enable me to prepare a judgment in writing, as the question raised by the refeerence seemed to me to be far from simple, specially, as in my opinion it turned upon a very minute point of the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical law. The learned Chief Justice and my learned brethren, however, were able on that occasion to form an opinion in the case, and make an order remanding the case for re-trial on certain issues. My brother Straight, whilst consenting to the order of re-trial, was inclined to the opinion that the evidence on the record was sufficient to justify the conviction. I was, however, unfortunately not able to concur in, or dissent from, the order for single reason that I had formed no definite opinion in the absence of the authorities of the Muhammadan Law, which had not been cited on either side.

Under these circumstances, it has devolved upon me now to deliver my judgement in the case, and I regret that the conclusion at which I have arrived is different from that at which the learned Chief Justice and the rest of the Court have done. In view of this circumstance and also because facts similar to those that exist in this case have before now been made the subject of a criminal prosecutions in cases which have ultimately come up to this court in revision, I wish to explain my reasons fully.

The facts of the case itself are very simple. The mosque in question in this case is situate in muhalla Maddanpura, in the city of Benares, and it was built by one Ali Muhammad alis Allu, who is stated by the prosecution to have followed the doctrine of Imam Abu Hanifa, and was therefore a Hanafi. The prosecutor, Abdullah, is a brother-in-law of the founder of the mosque, his sister having been married to Allu, and principal accused, Ramzan, is the son-in-law of Allu, and also otherwise related to him. The other two accused, Muhammad Husain and Abdul Rahman, are persons holding religious views similar to those held by Ramzan.

It appears that on the 22nd of August, 1884, the three accused joined the congregation in the mosque, and during the prayer said the word amin aloud. This appears to have led to a discussion as to whether it was right to say the word aloud in prayer, and a heated argument took place, resulting in the accused being turned out of the mosque with the help of the police, and the prosecutor prohibiting them from coming to the mosque again unless they renounced the rite of saying amin aloud in mosque.

On the 1st of September 1884, Abdullah and some other persons presented an application to the Magistrate, describing the occurrences of the 22nd August, and asking for interference of the Magisterial authorities on the ground that breach of peace was likely to take place by reason of the accused insisting upon saying the word amin aloud in prayers. No definite action appears to have been taken by the magisterial authorities on that application beyond sending it for inquiry to the City Inspector of Police, and matters seemed to have stood thus, when, on 20th of September 1884, Abdullah by himself filed another petition, complaining of the accused, and charging them with “the offence of insulting the religion of the Hanafia Musalmans” under S. 297, 298, 352 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate, after having examined the prosecutor and the witnesses for the prosecution, framed charges against the accused under S. 296 of the Indian Penal Code, and after having taken the evidence on behalf of the defence, convicted them under that section, and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 25 each, and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.

The accused have applied for revision to this Court under S. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground that “to pronounce the word amin in a loud tone during the prayers is not an offence punishable under S. 296 of the Indian Penal Code.”

The question so raised seems to me to involve mixed consideration of the meaning of the Indian Penal Code and Muhammadan Ecclesiastical Law; for according to my view, the application of the former depends upon the interpretation of the latter in connection with this case. But before discussing this question, I wish to express my views with reference to the observation which was made in the course of the argument, that this Court is not bound to consider the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical Law in such cases without having the rules of the law proved by specific evidence like any other facts in Litigation. I am unable to accept this view, because, it is conceded that the decision of this case depends (as I shall presently endeavour to show it does depend) upon the interpretation of the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical Law, it is to my mind the duty of this Court and of all Courts subordinate to it, to take judicial notice of such law. I hold that Cl (1) of S. 37 of the Evidence Act (1 of 1872) fully covers the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical law in such cases, because, whenever a question of civil right or the lawfulness of an act arises in a judicial proceedings, even a Criminal Court is bound, ex necessitate, to resort to the civil branch of the law; and, in a case like the present, the question being the right of a Muhammadan to pray in a mosque according to his tenets, the question of legality or illegality would fall under the purview of the express guarantee given by the Legislature in S. 24 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act (V1 of 1871), that the Muhammadan Law shall be administered with reference to all questions regarding “any religious usage or institution”. That the application of some of the sections of the Indian Penal Code depend almost entirely upon the correct interpretation of the rules of the civil law, cannot, in my opinion, be doubted; and if it is so, the present case is only another illustration of this principle. Indeed, I am prepared to go the length of saying that, but for this principle, the rules of the Penal Code would in many cases operate as a great injustice, and acts fully justified by the civil law would constitute offences under that Code. I hold therefore that in a case like the present, the provisions of S. 36 of the Evidence Act fully relieve the parties from the necessity of proving the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical Law upon the subject, that law is not to be placed upon the same footing with reference to this matter as any foreign law of which judicial notice cannot be taken by the Courts in British India; and it follows that I can refer to the Muhammadan Ecclesiastical Law for the purpose of this case, notwithstanding the absence of any specific evidence on the record regarding its rules.

Now before going further, I wish to observe that the main allegations on behalf of the prosecution, contained in the petition of the 14th September 1884, and in that of 24th September 1884 relate to the conduct of the accused in saying the word amin aloud during prayers in the mosque; that in the evidence for the prosecution itself the loud utterance of that word is the graramen of the accusation; that the Magistrate framed charges under S. 296, Indian Penal Code, with reference to that matter alone, disregarding the other section of the Indian Penal Code cited on behalf of the prosecution; and that his judgement entirely proceeds upon the view that the loud utterance of the word amin during prayers constitutes a criminal offence under the circumstances of this case. It is true that in the evidence for the prosecution there were vague allegations as to other facts which might possibly have furnished basis for charging the accused under some other sections of the Indian penal Code; but as a matter of fact, the Magistrate did not charge or try the accused under any other section, and at all events we in the Full Bench are not concerned with the whole case.

Holding these views, I feel myself called upon, sitting as a Judge in the Full Bench to which the reference has been made solely as to S. 296 of the Indian Penal Code, to consider the case for the purpose of answering the reference only in that aspect, leaving it to the referring Bench to decide questions which may possibly arise in the case beyond the scope of the question referred.

But before discussing the various elements of the offence described in the section, I think it necessary to consider whether the saying of amin aloud in prayers is not an act which falls within the purview of S. 79 of the Indian Penal Code, which lays down the elementary proposition of the criminal law that “nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of the fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law in doing it.”

The word amin is of Semitic origin, being used both in Arabic and Hebrew, and has been adopted in prayers by Muhammadans as much as by Christians. The word does not occur in the Koran, but, in conformity with the Sunna, or the practice of the Prophet, it is regarded by Muhammadans as an essential part of the prayers, as a word representing earnestness in devotion. The word is pronounced at the end of the first chapter of the Kuran, which consists the following prayers:-

“Praise be to God, the Lord of all creatures; the most Merciful; the king of the day of Judgement. Thee do we worship, and of Thee do we beg assistance. Direct us in the right way, in the way of those to whom Thou hast been gracious, not those against whom Thou art incensed, nor of those who go astray.”

In order to understand the exact difficulty which has arisen in this case with reference to the word amin, it is necessary to bear in mind that Muhammadanism, like other religions, is divided into various sects or schools of doctrines, differing from each other in matters of principle or in matters of detail as to the minor points of ritual. ” The Musalmans who assume to themselves the distinction of orthodox, are such as maintain the most obvious interpretation of the Kuran and the obligatory force of tradition in opposition to the innovations of the sectaries, whence they are termed Sunnis or traditionists …… and it is their opinion alone which is admitted to have any weight in the determination of jurisprudence.” These four schools or sects, of which this concise account has been given by Mr Hamilton in the Preliminary Discourse of his translation of the Hedaya, were founded by the four orthodox Imams, namely, Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafai, and (Ahmad bin) Hanbal, all of whom flourished within the first two centuries of the Muhammadan era, or eighth century of the Christian era. To use the language of Mr. Hamilton again:-

” The word orthodox as here used is confined purely to a justness of thinking in spiritual matters, concerning which opinions of those four sects perfectly coincide, the differences among them relating solely to their exposition of the temporal law.” (Continue)

عید

اب کے دنیا میں عجب ڈھنگ سے عید آئی ہے                                                                                     کوئی تکبیر، نہ تہلیل و جبیں سائی ہے

ہُو کا عالَم، اداسی کے ہیں ڈیرے ہر سُو                                                                                    وحشت و خوف کا ماحول ہے، تنہائی ہے

دیکھنے چاند کو نکلا نہ کوئی چاند کہیں                                                                                     نہ کوئی زلف کسی بام پہ لہرائی ہے

کوئی عیدی، نہ مٹھائی، نہ کھلونے، اے عید                                                                                     نونہالوں کے لیے تحفے میں کیا لائی ہے؟

منہ چھپائے ہوئے جو دُور سے کرتا ہے سلام                                                                                     اجنبی سمجھا تھا جس کو وہ مِرا بھائی ہے

عید پر روٹھے ہوؤں سے بھی گلے ملتے تھے                                                                                     اب کے پیاروں سے بھی دوری میں ہی دانائی ہے

ایسے کترا کے نکلتے ہیں گھروں سے جیسے                                                                                     اپنی دہلیز نہیں، کوچۂ رسوائی ہے

یوں ہے احباب سے کچھ شوقِ ملاقات کا حال                                                                                     پیش قدمی میں تذبذب بھری پسپائی ہے

دبکے بیٹھے ہیں سبھی جیسے قفس میں بلبل                                                                                     کوئی محفل، نہ کہیں انجمن آرائی ہے

چار جانب تو ہے بے رنگ وبا کی آندھی                                                                                     سر پہ افلاس کی بھی سرخ گھٹا چھائی ہے

ساری دنیا میں کورونا ہی ہے موضوعِ خبر                                                                                     ساری دنیا میں ہر اک چیز کورونائی ہے

مبتلا خوف میں ہے وہ جو ابھی ہے محفوظ                                                                                     وہ بھی بیمار ہے جس جس نے شفا پائی ہے

ہے دعا بھیج کسی عیسیٰ نفس کو یارب                                                                                     خلق سب منتظر دستِ مسیحائی ہے

خواجہ محمد عارف، برمنگھم

تبصرہ کریں